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Abstract 
 
General Budget Support (GBS) is assumed to lead to more effective poverty 
reduction through non-earmarking of the money and through recipient country 
ownership. A second and more hidden objective of GBS, however, is to influence 
policies and governance of recipient countries. This paper develops an evaluation 
framework that takes the tensions between these two objectives into account. It then 
assesses the results of GBS in Nicaragua under two administrations. It concludes 
that for most donors, the aim of improving governance was more important than 
poverty reduction, in both government periods, thus reducing the effect of GBS on 
poverty reduction. In addition, donor influence on governance was limited. 
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1. Introduction 
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From around 2000 onward, many donors began to see budget support as the preferred aid 
modality. This drive towards budget support received a boost through the various High-
Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness held in Rome (February 2003), Paris (March 2005) 
and Accra (September 2008). General Budget Support (GBS) was seen as the ideal form 
of meeting both the alignment objective (aligning with recipient governments’ strategies, 
institutions and procedures) and harmonisation. By improving national 'ownership', 
reducing transaction costs, and strengthening national systems, budget support was 
expected to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of aid and to enhance poverty 
reduction in recipient countries. 
 In practice, many donors also see GBS as an instrument to improve policies and 
governance of recipient countries, and sometimes even to promote democratic 
governance. Studies of the conditionality around budget support (Molenaers et al., 2010; 
Hayman, 2011) revealed that there are tensions and possible trade-offs between the 
objective to influence governance and the official GBS objective of achieving more 
effective poverty reduction through improved country ownership and more donor 
harmonisation. These tensions and possible trade-offs also complicate the evaluation of 
budget support.  
 Most evaluations of GBS roughly follow the evaluation framework established by 
Lawson and Booth (Lawson and Booth, 2004), in turn based on earlier evaluations of 
programme aid (White, 1996; White and Dijkstra, 2003). However, while the attempt to 
influence policies in the past was one of the two inputs for earlier programme aid and was 
meant to enhance the ultimate objective, economic growth and poverty reduction, this is 
much less clear for the attempt to influence governance. Although donors claim that good 
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governance and democracy are necessary for development, the empirical basis for this 
conviction is weak (See, for example,  Leftwich, 1993; Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 
2006; Khan, 2006; Chang, 2011). In addition, GBS is supposed to be based on country 
ownership, and is therefore called 'partnership GBS' (Hammond, 2006; IDD and 
Associates, 2006). Commonly used evaluation frameworks include the words 'policy 
dialogue' , 'conditionality', along with 'ownership' (Lawson et al., 2005; Hammond, 2006; 
IDD and Associates, 2006; Lawson et al., 2007), they do not take into account that donors 
will only be prepared to respect 'ownership' if there is at least a minimum of preference 
alignment between donors and recipient. If this preference alignment is absent, some of 
the assumed advantages of GBS are unlikely to be achieved. 
 This paper builds on evaluation frameworks used in earlier studies, but recognises 
the contradictions in the underlying intervention theory of the donors . An adjusted 
evaluation framework is then used to examine the results of budget support provided to 
Nicaragua between 2005 and 2009. Nicaragua is one of the poorest countries of the 
Western Hemisphere and has an aid dependency level similar to many Sub-Saharan 
African countries. The country provides an interesting case to study the possible trade-
offs between the two objectives for GBS. During the period 2005-2009 the country had 
two different governments. In the first period, Enrique Bolaños of the liberal party was 
president. He was in favour of institutional and governance reforms in the country and 
these ideas very much coincided with donor priorities. He also favoured liberalisation of 
the economy and was not very interested in the consequences for the poor. After the 
presidential elections at the end of 2006, President Daniel Ortega of the FSLN took over. 
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This new government prioritised poverty reduction in its socio-economic policies but was 
much less inclined to change governance.  
 The paper begins by reflecting on the expected advantages of budget support and 
examining the possible contradictions in the underlying intervention theory. This leads to 
an outline of the methodology used for the evaluation of GBS in Nicaragua. The next 
section provides some background on the political economy of Nicaragua and on 
governance in the two periods in which GBS was provided. The paper then proceeds to 
assess the implementation of GBS in Nicaragua, and in particular whether this 
implementation was in line with the objectives ownership, harmonisation and 
predictability. The next two sections examine the results of the donor attempts to 
influence policies and governance and the other possible intermediate and final results of 
GBS. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Expected advantages of budget support and methodology 
 
General Budget Support (GBS) is a form of programme aid, along with balance of 
payments support and debt relief. Programme aid is aid that is not linked to specific 
project activities (OECD, 1991).  The idea of general budget support as the preferred aid 
modality has grown, first, out of growing disenchantment with the dominant aid 
modality, namely project aid. Project aid leads to high transaction costs for recipient 
governments, as each donor has its own disbursement conditions and its own 
implementation and reporting requirements. In addition, donors often set up their own 
project implementation units, poaching highly qualified staff away from local institutions. 
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Furthermore, project money is often highly unpredictable. All these practices undermine 
and weaken the country's own capacities for planning, budgeting and implementation of 
development projects. In addition, many of these donor-driven projects are not aligned 
with the country's own priorities and weaken domestic accountability. GBS would 
therefore contribute to a better coordination of development projects under the country's  
leadership, to lower transaction costs, more predictability of funding, and a strengthening 
of domestic capacities. It would ultimately also have political effects in the form of 
enhanced domestic accountability. 
 Secondly, general budget support is considered a response to disappointing effects 
of earlier practices of programme aid, in particular balance of payments support, in the 
1980s and 1990s. This programme aid was accompanied by policy conditions, and 
research showed that these conditions were only implemented if they coincided with 
domestic political preferences and interests (Collier et al., 1997; Dollar and Svensson, 
2000; Dijkstra, 2002). This led to a plea for more selectivity: budget support should be 
targeted to countries with good policies and good governance. It was hoped that 
selectivity 'ex post', on proven levels of policies and governance, would reduce the need 
for conditionality 'ex ante' and bring about more 'ownership'. Ownership would lead to 
better implementation of policies, and thus to more effective poverty reduction. All in all, 
the advantages of GBS are based on two crucial elements: the non-earmarking of the 
money provided and country ownership. 
 However, country 'ownership' in the sense of the country having 'ownership of 
development efforts' cannot be taken for granted (Booth, 2011:  4). Often the country's 
policies do not promote development. Many studies show that in order for a policy 
 7 
dialogue to have a chance of success, a minimum of preference alignment between 
donors and recipient is necessary. This can be guaranteed, to some extent, by the use of 
entry conditions. Most donors claim that they maintain strict entry conditions for GBS, 
including, for example, prudent macroeconomic policies, good governance, transparent 
and accountable public financial management systems, and a national development plan 
that prioritises poverty reduction. But in practice they have also started budget support if 
governments had (stated) intentions of improving policies, governance or public financial 
management or even if some of these conditions were not met at all. As a result, donors 
(begin to) use budget support to bring about the desired changes in policies and 
governance Some donors, for example the European Commission, are very explicit about 
this objective of budget support. For them, GBS is 'no blank cheque' but a means to 
guarantee that countries will 'stay on course' with respect to improvements in  
(democratic) governance and policies (European Commission, 2008). This may not only 
imply a return of 'ex ante' conditionality, but also means that GBS in fact has two 
objectives. One objective is to achieve more effective poverty reduction by providing 
freely spendable money that can be used in line with the country's own priorities, and the 
other is that of influencing the country's policies and governance. If countries do not 
sufficiently comply with donor conditions, a trade-off between the two objectives may 
appear. For example, if donors reduce disbursements in order to pressure the government 
to change policies or outcomes with respect to one objective, they will hamper the 
achievement of the other one. 
 The return of ex ante conditionality can also be expected to undermine other 
assumed advantages of GBS, especially if there is a large gap between preferences of 
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donors and those of the recipient. First, the attempt to influence governance and policies 
will increase transaction costs, both for the donors and for the recipient government. In 
general, transaction costs exist precisely because donors want to secure spending and 
implementation in line with their preferences (Martens, 2008). Second, if the criteria for 
compliance are not clear or if donors do not respond in a reliable way, sanctions may 
affect the predictability of budget support disbursements. Third, conditionality may 
hamper the hoped for more effective implementation of (donor-desired) policies. Fourth, 
donor opinions on what good governance, good policies, and good policy outcomes are, 
may vary. The World Bank, being constrained by its articles of agreement, is usually only 
concerned with the more technocratic aspects of governance, while bilateral donors and 
also the EU usually add a concern with democratic governance, demanding free elections 
and the protection of civil and human rights ( Leftwich, 1993; Doornbos, 2001). Also 
among different bilateral donors, priorities within good governance and poverty reduction 
policies will vary. This will reduce donor harmonisation, both with respect to inputs for 
the policy dialogue and with respect to disbursement criteria. Fifth and finally, there is 
the risk that an extensive policy dialogue between donors and recipient government will 
weaken domestic accountability. Governments that succeed in pleasing the donors and 
consequently receive a lot of discretionary aid, are able to buy out, neglect or even 
suppress the domestic opposition (Whitfield, 2009). 
  
 These contradictions of the intervention theory must be taken into account when 
evaluating the results of GBS. The evaluation matrix (Table 1) shows the intervention 
theory for GBS, tracing the expected outputs, outcomes and impact that follow from the 
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two GBS inputs, the money and the donor priorities for entry conditions and for the 
policy dialogue. The fact that there are two objectives for budget support implies that 
improved governance must also be included both at impact level.   
  
Table 1 here 
 
 When investigating the implementation of GBS, it is important to examine whether 
entry conditions have been complied with and to what extent the preferences of donors 
and recipient are aligned. It will also be assessed to what extent the entry conditions and 
donor inputs for the policy dialogue are harmonised among the donors. With respect to 
the other input, the money, it will be examined to what extent donor procedures and 
disbursement criteria are harmonised, and whether disbursements have been predictable. 
At output level, a first question is whether donor conditions have led to changes in 
governance and policies that would otherwise not have come about. Other expected 
outputs are related to the other expected benefits of this aid modality: domestic systems 
strengthened, transaction costs lowered and domestic accountability improved. 
Furthermore, it is examined whether the additional money provided in the form of budget 
support leads to a lower deficit, higher government expenditure for poverty reduction, or 
both. 
 If the right conditions have been set and if they are implemented, governance 
indicators and policies of the country should improve. The additional money for poverty 
reduction, combined with lower transaction costs and strengthened domestic systems 
should lead to more and better service delivery. Ultimately, by way of better government 
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policies and more available money, GBS should promote economic growth and poverty 
reduction. This leads to four evaluation questions:  
1. Has General Budget Support (GBS) been implemented in a harmonised and 
predictable way and were  the preferences sufficiently aligned for donors to 
respect 'ownership'? 
2. Have the donors through GBS been able to influence policies and governance? If 
the answer is yes, then how did they do that and what are the results?  
3. Has GBS been able to strengthen national systems, to reduce transaction costs, to 
strengthen domestic accountability and to increase government expenditure, in 
particular social expenditure? 
4. Have government policies and institutions, supported by GBS money and possibly 
changed by donor influence through the GBS policy dialogue, become more 
effective in fostering economic growth and in reducing poverty? 
 
 For answering these questions, many documents have been consulted published by 
the Nicaraguan government and donor organisations, and statistical data have been 
gathered. In addition, interviews have been held with representatives and officers of  
consecutive Nicaraguan governments and government institutions, of donor organisations 
and of civil society. These interviews were conducted during two field visits for this 
evaluation in the year 2009. The author also used interviews conducted in 2004 and 2006 
in the context of previous studies.  
 
3. The political background in Nicaragua  
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Nicaragua is one of the poorest countries in Latin America with a per capita income of 
around US$1000 in 2009 (World Bank, WDI-online 2011). It has a turbulent political 
economic history. Between 1939 and 1979, the country was ruled almost continuously by 
the Somoza family under a dictatorship. Although economic growth was high during the 
1950s and 60s, with real GDP rising at an average rate of 7 per cent a year (Bulmer-
Thomas, 1987), much of the Nicaraguan population lived in poverty and did not have 
access to education, health care or water and sanitation. After the victory of the left-wing 
FSLN (Frente Sandinista para la Liberación Nacional) in 1979 the economy first 
recovered. State influence over the economy became strong and access to social services 
expanded.  However, growth could not be maintained. This was partly due to policy 
inconsistencies and partly to a devastating civil war in which the US government 
financed the armed opposition (Leogrande, 1996). 
 The elections in 1990 led to a victory of the opposition under the leadership of 
President Violeta Chamorro. This government managed to control the hyperinflation and 
started a series of economic reforms supported by IMF and World Bank. During Ms 
Chamorro’s presidency aid was provided in large amounts, but this changed after the 
1996 elections won by Mr Arnoldo Alemán. This government did not show much interest 
in cooperating with the donors, and there were increasing signs of large-scale corruption 
by the president and his closest allies. In October 1999, the ruling liberal party (Partido 
Liberal Constituyente, PLC) made an agreement with the second largest party in the 
Assembly, the FSLN, in which they divided all seats on the Supreme Court, the Electoral 
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Council, and several other public bodies. This 'Pacto', still in operation today, virtually 
meant the end to parliamentary opposition and also to independent state institutions. 
 The 2001 elections were won by Mr Enrique Bolaños of the same PLC, who had 
been vice-president under Alemán. However, one of his first actions was to have the 
corruption of his predecessor investigated. In August 2002 Alemán was indicted for 
misappropriating US$ 97 million during his presidency. Later that year he was convicted 
and sent to jail. This gained Bolaños ample support from the donors. But almost all PLC 
members in the National Assembly continued to side with Alemán so that Bolaños did 
not have much support in Parliament. 
 The primary objective of the Bolaños government, as laid down in its National 
Development Plan, was economic growth. This was to be achieved by maintaining 
macroeconomic stability and by creating a more favourable climate for investment and in 
particular foreign investment. Ownership rights had to be better guaranteed, and state 
institutions had to be modernised. It was assumed that economic growth would 
automatically trickle down to the poor. However, the lack of support in Parliament and 
the earlier concluded Pacto between the FSLN and the PLC prevented many institutional 
changes from coming about. The Bolaños government was only able to change 
institutions over which it had direct control, such as public financial management.  
 Early 2007, the newly elected FSLN government of President Daniel Ortega took 
office. This changed the governance context. In fact, this change already began at the end 
of 2006, when the National Assembly approved the penalisation of therapeutic abortion,
1
 
with support of the FSLN. This gained the FSLN important support from the conservative 
Catholic Church in the upcoming presidential elections. 
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 The Ortega government showed a willingness to maintain macroeconomic stability 
and to negotiate an agreement with the IMF, which was achieved in October 2007. It also 
appeared willing to maintain the improvements in public finance management. Moreover, 
the government gave a high priority to poverty reduction. It announced free education 
and health care services, and introduced special programmes for the poor, such as 
Hambre Cero and Usura Cero.
2
 The aim of these programmes is to make the poor more 
productive. On the other hand, the government operated in a more secret way, and more 
power became concentrated in the hands of the president and his wife. The country began 
to receive large amounts of aid from Venezuela but these funds were managed in a non-
transparent way, thus providing rumours that they were primarily used for party interests 
- in particular, securing re-election of President Ortega - rather than state interests. 
 In the course of 2007 and 2008, there were increasing signs that the Ortega 
government did not have much affinity with values related to a liberal democracy. It 
promoted so-called 'direct democracy' by installing CPCs, Councils of Citizen Power, 
leading to concerns of exclusion on party-political basis. There were instances of 
harassment of civil society representatives and concerns about decreasing press freedom. 
In June 2008, the government took away legal personality of two opposition parties, so 
that they would not be able to participate in the municipal elections of November that 
year. In the elections themselves, the leading party committed fraud in at least 33 and 
probably around 40 of the about 180 municipalities, including the capital Managua and 
the second largest city, León.
3
 
  
4. The implementation of budget support  
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In 2003, Sweden and The Netherlands took the initiative for setting up a Budget Support 
Group, with the aim of establishing, together with the government, a harmonised system 
for general budget support. The expectation of higher aid effectiveness, in line with the 
official donor wisdom, was the most important motivation. In addition, at a general level 
donors had confidence in the Bolaños’ government: its policy priorities (economic 
growth and macroeconomic stability) and its perceived willingness to fight corruption - 
evidenced from jailing predecessor Alemán - , to modernise the state and to improve the 
rule of law. Most members of the Budget Support Group were involved in technical 
assistance programmes for the improvement of public finance management, and they 
were confident that these efforts would be successful. 
 
Design of GBS and harmonisation 
 
After two years of preparation, in May 2005 a Joint Financing Arrangement (JFA) was 
signed by the government of Nicaragua and nine donors: the European Commission, 
Finland, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom 
(UK), and the World Bank. The IDB joined in 2007. The JFA defined the procedures for 
providing GBS, with an annual Meeting in May of year n in which the achievement of the 
past year (n-1) would be assessed. Within four weeks after the meeting, donors would 
indicate their preliminary commitments for the next year (n+1). In the Mid-Year Meeting 
in August, the country’s performance in year n would be assessed and within four weeks 
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after that the donor commitments for year n+1 had to be confirmed in order to include 
them in the government budget. 
 The JFA defined some 'fundamental principles' that both donors and government 
had to abide with. They were formulated as: 
 'commitments to international law and conflict prevention, respect for human 
rights, democratic principles including free and fair elections, the rule of law, 
independence of the judiciary, free, transparent and democratic processes, 
accountability and the fight against corruption, sound macroeconomic policies and 
commitment to poverty reduction.' (Government of Nicaragua and donors, 2005: 5). 
In case of non compliance with these principles, disbursements could be withheld. 
However, it was not very clear how this would be applied. Some of them, like an 
independent judiciary, were not fulfilled at the start, and several other principles were 
only weakly present, if at all. For none of them a minimum level was defined so that it 
was impossible for the government to know in which case disbursements would be at 
risk.  
 Donors and government also agreed on a Performance Assessment Matrix (PAM). 
This PAM contained in total 160 policies, measures and indicators for a period of two 
years (2005-2006). Although the JFA specified a time schedule for the monitoring of the 
PAM and of the consequences, also in this case it was not clear how it was going to be 
used. In practice, all agencies had their own implicit priorities within the PAM and the 
fundamental principles. Some donors made their disbursement criteria explicit. The 
World Bank continued to identify specific disbursement 'triggers' related to its Poverty 
Reduction Support Credit. Both the EC and Switzerland applied a so-called split response 
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mechanism: part of disbursements were linked to a general assessment of the PAM and 
the fundamental principles. Another part was linked to the degree of performance in 
specific indicators.  
 
Alignment of preferences 
 
 It can be doubted whether the conditions for providing budget support were met in 
Nicaragua. First and as argued above, some of the 'fundamental principles' were not 
fulfilled at the start and others were only weakly present. The 'Pacto', supported by the 
majority in the National Assembly, prevented the coming into being of institutions related 
to liberal democracy like the rule of law and an independent judiciary. The donors 
expected that they would be able to use the leverage of budget support to support the 
Executive in its governance modernisation agenda, against an unwilling parliament and 
unwilling other state institutions. This can be considered optimistic and naïve. 
 A second problem was that at the start of the agreement, donors knew or could 
know that the Bolaños government was not much interested in poverty reduction, for 
example judging from the first version of the National Development Plan. Some donors 
agreed with the government that private sector growth would result automatically in 
poverty reduction, but most donors expected to address the government's lack of attention 
for poverty reduction in the policy dialogue accompanying budget support. However, it 
can be doubted whether budget support is relevant at all if donor and government 
preferences regarding poverty reduction are so divergent. 
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 Given these divergent preferences, it is not surprising that the content of the 2005 
PAM was dominated by donor wishes. Donors wanted to use budget support to influence 
all areas and sectors of government policy: macroeconomic, public financial 
management, social policies, governance, infrastructure policies and policies for the 
productive sector. 'Actions' often included laws to be approved by the National 
Assembly, or measures to be taken by entities over which the Executive had little 
influence, such as the Supreme Audit Institution or the Supreme Court. In the next year, 
donors and government managed to reduce the number of actions and indicators from 161 
to 109, but they were still largely donor-driven. 
 Under the Ortega government, both donors and government were willing to 
continue the GBS agreement. However, given that the FSLN was signatory to the Pacto, 
opinions about the fundamental principles now widely differed between the Executive 
and the donors. The JFA was maintained, but the new government managed to reduce the 
number of indicators and targets of the PAM and to bring them more in line with its own 
policy priorities.  
 
Amounts and predictability 
 
Appendix Table 1 shows that programme aid in general, and budget support in particular, 
was small relative to total aid disbursements 2001-2008, although in 2004 (pre-JFA), 
2006 and 2007 the amounts were substantial and exceeded US$ 100 million. In  2004 and 
2006, budget support constituted more than 10 per cent of the government budget and 
about 2.5 per cent of GDP. Total aid in most years amounted to more than half of the 
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budget and more than 10 per cent of GDP, showing that project aid was still the dominant 
aid modality in Nicaragua. 
 On average, programme aid represented 13.3 per cent of total aid between 2005 and 
2008, and 5.9 per cent of total expenditure. This is higher than between 2001 and 2004, 
when the relative figures were 7.2 and 4.2 per cent, respectively. However, if we look at a 
longer time frame, programme aid has become less important. Between 1995 and 2000, 
the share of programme aid in total aid was 22 per cent (Dijkstra and Komives, 2011). 
In the period of the JFA, the European Commission was the largest budget support donor 
with a quarter of total resources provided. The World Bank and IDB also provided large 
amounts. 
 Appendix Table 1 also shows that year-to-year fluctuations in budget support 
disbursements were large. While pledges and disbursements were almost equal in 2006 
and 2007, this was not the case in 2005 and 2008, mostly as a result of donor sanctions to 
government behaviour. Since the criteria for disbursement were not very clear, donor 
responses were not always predictable for the government. Another aspect of 
predictability is about the timing of disbursements within a budget year. In all four years, 
a large part of budget support resources was received in the last quarter of the year. This 
complicated financial management for the government.  
 
5. Influence 
 
This section assesses the processes and channels used for exerting influence, and the 
results. The main channel for the policy dialogue were the bi-annual high level meetings 
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between donors and government in which performance on the PAM was assessed. During 
these meetings, the government explained its performance and the donors were able to 
express their priorities within PAM and fundamental principles. During the first Annual 
Meeting in May 2005, when the ink of the JFA had barely dried, a first conflict appeared. 
While 'macroeconomic stability as defined by the IMF' was part of the agreed PAM, the 
government did not comply with some requirements of the IMF programme. All 
macroeconomic targets were met, but the National Assembly had failed to approve some 
laws that the IMF considered necessary for medium-term macroeconomic stability, one 
of them being a pension system reform. In response, the donors decided to hold up their 
disbursements for about six months. The suspension of disbursements actually added 
leverage not only to the IMF, but in particular to the executive power vis-à-vis the 
National Assembly. 
 Donors have also sometimes used the threat of suspension of disbursements, in 
particular in relation to some governance-related indicators of the PAM. This occurred 
for example when the Supreme Audit Institution failed to audit the public accounts and 
when the Supreme Court refused to approve the 'regulations' for the implementation of 
the Judicial Career Law. 
 After the change in government in 2007, the policy dialogue was increasingly 
focused on the fundamental principles rather than on the PAM. From 2008 onwards, 
donors again began to withhold GBS in response to concerns about governance.  Donor 
responses were now much less harmonised than in 2005. In addition, the number of GBS 
donors was reduced: Sweden and the UK decided to stop GBS because headquarters had 
decided to leave the country  and Germany because there were doubts about the GBS 
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instrument globally. In 2008, a government change in Finland provoked the unilateral 
withdrawal of this country from the JFA. The removing of legal personality from two 
opposition parties in 2008 led to a decision by headquarters in the Netherlands to halve its 
planned GBS amount for that year. After the November 2008 election fraud, the bilateral 
donors and the EU decided to suspend their disbursements fully.
4
 In the meantime, the 
two banks continued to provide GBS resources. 
 In March 2009, under the influence of the economic crisis which provoked much 
lower tax revenues and also lower aid from Venezuela,
5
 the government re-opened the 
dialogue with the remaining bilateral donors (Netherlands and Switzerland) and the EU.  
The donors began to focus on guaranteeing the democratic nature of the next elections - 
elections for three regional governments held in March 2010. In June 2009, the 
government conceded that it would admit observers to these elections. In response to this 
concession, the EU decided to unfreeze an amount of  €10 million of a total of  €60 
million in programmed budget support, earmarking this money for the education sector. 
The other donors kept waiting for more concessions. However, no other political 
concessions came about, and in fact no national observers were admitted to the March 
2010 elections. The remaining non-bank donors decided not to renew the JFA in 2010.  
 
Results of the policy dialogue 
 
It is impossible to analyze the results on all indicators of the PAM and on all fundamental 
principles. For this reason, the analysis focuses on i) average compliance with PAM 
policies and indicators, ii) cases in which donor disbursements were suspended, and iii) 
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topics that received a lot of attention during the policy dialogue (as revealed in the reports 
of those meetings) and/or that were seen as important achievements of the policy 
dialogue by donor representatives interviewed. 
 Average compliance with the indicators of the PAM was limited during 2005 and 
2006 and much higher in 2007 and 2008.
6
 This is not surprising, since in the later period 
the policies and targets were much more in line with government wishes, and were often 
easier to achieve. The average degree of compliance of the PAM did not have 
consequences for the flow of budget support. During the Bolaños government donors 
continued to disburse although some important social indicators were deteriorating, such 
as the primary school enrolment rate. In spite of the good performance on the PAM in the 
second period, the donors used the instrument of suspending (part of) disbursements - for 
political and governance reasons. 
 In 2005, the combined pressure of all GBS donors was successful in the sense that 
towards the end of the year, Parliament approved the required laws. However, some of 
these laws violated the Constitution and the extent of implementation of all approved 
laws was low. The Dutch decision to halve budget support in 2008 was meant to pressure 
the government to return legal personality to the two opposition parties but this did not 
happen.
7
 The suspension of disbursements after the municipal election fraud did not lead 
to changes in that election result nor did the subsequent policy dialogue succeed in 
improving the democratic nature of next (regional) elections. 
 According to the donors, the most important achievements of the policy dialogue 
were increases in poverty expenditure, improved transparency of budgets, the fact that for 
the first time budget execution has been audited by the Supreme Audit Institution, the 
 22 
approval of the Judicial Career Law and its regulations, and the approval of the Law of 
access to information.  
 Poverty expenditure increased as per cent of total expenditure and as per cent of 
GDP between 2002 and 2005, but remained at about the same level after that (Appendix 
Table 2).The rise in poverty expenditure thus preceded GBS and cannot be ascribed to the 
policy dialogue around GBS.  Furthermore, the increase in poverty expenditure between 
2002 and 2005 covered only 44 per cent of the resources released by debt relief in that 
period (Guimarães and Avendaño, 2011). Social expenditure in per cent of GDP 
continued to increase in 2006, but especially in education a relatively large share of this 
went to tertiary education of which mainly the non-poor benefit  (Moore and Soto, 2007). 
Health expenditure also proved to be badly targeted, with much more emphasis on 
curative care than on prevention (World Bank, 2007). During the GBS policy dialogue, 
donors repeatedly requested figures on the regional breakdown of health expenditure in 
order to track resource flows to the poorest regions, but to no avail. 
 As a result of continuous donor pressure, budget execution has indeed been audited 
from 2007 onwards. This occurred with long delays and the audits (supposedly a 
constitutional task of the Supreme Audit Institution) required additional donor money. 
More importantly, the Supreme Audit Institution is led by persons appointed according to 
the Pacto, so the actual results are limited. In addition, so far no follow-up has been given 
to the - limited - findings. 
 The approval of the Judicial Career Law in 2005 was clearly a result of donor 
influence. It implied that judges - at least, those below the highest level - were to be 
appointed according to merit. However, the government maintained that the law could 
 23 
not be implemented without 'regulations'. After three years of heavy donor pressure, the 
EU for example postponing its Judicial sector budget support programme, these 
regulations were approved in 2008. But even after this approval judges were still 
appointed 'retroactively'. Independent observers are of the view that no impartial justice 
exists in the country and that the law did not bring improvements. 
 All in all, there were some formal results of the influence attempts, but the extent of 
actual influence was limited. The donors were not able at all to exert influence on 
political topics such as free and fair elections and the importance of the CPCs. 
 
6. Intermediate and final outcomes of GBS  
 
The third evaluation question focuses on intermediate outcomes of GBS: has GBS been 
able to strengthen national systems, to reduce transaction costs, to strengthen domestic 
accountability and to increase government expenditure? 
 The preparations for the JFA and the policy dialogue around budget support 
brought an intensive schedule of meetings for both donors and government 
representatives, so transaction costs were high. All three types of transaction costs 
(information and search costs, negotiation costs, and monitoring and bonding costs) were 
probably higher and sometimes much higher than for projects. Yet, given that the 
amounts disbursed in GBS were much higher than those for an average project, GBS has 
contributed to a lowering of transaction costs.
8
 
 GBS and the accompanying policy dialogue also contributed to improved policy 
coordination within the government. In addition,  before and during the period in which 
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donors provided GBS, the government's budgeting, planning and reporting systems 
improved. This was largely due to technical assistance programmes of donors, and was 
helped by a strong commitment of government officers. Yet, budget support gave the 
impulse for these technical assistance programmes. Under the Bolaños government, these 
government systems also became more transparent. This led to some improvements in 
domestic accountability: Parliament began to discuss not only budgets but also the actual 
use of resources, and civil society actively used the available information as well. 
However, under President Ortega, and despite the adoption of a Public Access to 
Information Law in 2007, actual government transparency was greatly reduced. 
 With respect to the macroeconomic effects of GBS, there is no evidence that it led 
to reduced tax income, as this income steadily increased from 2002 onward (Appendix 
Table 2). Expenditure remained at about the same level (in per cent of GDP) from 2004 
onward, so the deficit decreased. GBS may have contributed to a reduction in the deficit, 
but it is more likely that the government was determined to reduce it irrespective of the 
level of GBS, especially in view of the relative uncertainty about GBS and the fact that 
most resources were disbursed in the fourth quarter of the budget year. Given that there is 
a close link between movements in GBS (in particular the increase in 2004 and the 
decrease in 2008) and movements in the domestic financing of the deficit (Appendix 
Table 2), the most likely effect of GBS is a decrease in the domestic financing of the 
budget deficit, in other words, amortisation of domestic debt. This means that GBS 
contributed to macroeconomic stability during the years 2004-2007.  
 
Final outcomes and impact  
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The fourth evaluation question was whether government policies and institutions, 
supported by GBS money and possibly changed by donor influence through the GBS 
policy dialogue, have become more effective in fostering economic growth and in 
reducing poverty. This question partly builds on the results of donor influence on policies 
and governance, which turned out to be limited. After 2005 poverty expenditure did not 
increase and the donors did not succeed in (or did not try hard enough) inducing the 
Bolaños government to pay more attention to poverty reduction or to improve the 
targeting of social expenditure.  
 Poverty reduction has become much higher on the agenda of the Ortega 
government, but this was not the result of donor influence. From 2008 onwards, donors 
have reduced GBS disbursements. In this sense they only briefly supported the poverty 
policies of the new administration. 
 
Impact on poverty reduction 
 
The trends in poverty and social indicators broadly support the differences in policies 
over the years. Over the long term, from 1993 onwards, most social indicators improved. 
However, in the period 2001-2006, the period of the Bolaños government, the picture is 
much less favourable. Progress on social indicators was limited, with small improvements 
in infant and child mortality and virtual stagnation in primary school enrolment rates 
(Appendix Table 3). Family planning coverage declined from 25 per cent in 2001 to 13 
per cent in 2005 (World Bank, 2008). In access to water and sanitation, some progress 
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was made between 2001 and 2005 and also, it seems, between 2007 and 2008 (Appendix 
Table 3).  Government figures show increased school enrolment and a much lower 
illiteracy rate in 2008. However, the reliability of many of these figures, especially those 
provided by the government, can be questioned.  
 The developments in the poverty headcount are even more striking. After a slow 
but continuous decrease in poverty between 1993 and 2001, the poverty rate and also the 
extreme poverty rate slightly increased between 2001 and 2005, during the Bolaños 
presidency. This increase occurred despite a positive average growth of 3.2 per cent in 
those years. Nicaragua had a positive poverty elasticity in this period (World Bank, 
2008), which is very unusual. Between 2005 and 2009, and although average growth 
declined somewhat to 2.7 per cent per year, mainly due to the 2009 global economic 
crisis, poverty decreased, especially in rural areas (Figure 1). This trend continued in 
2010. The fall in extreme poverty after 2005 was even more spectacular, and again 
especially in rural areas (FIDEG, 2010, 2011). It seems that changes in policies during 
the Ortega administration did make a difference. 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The expected advantages of General Budget Support are based on two features: the 
provision of freely spendable money and respect for ownership. Donors will only be 
prepared to respect ownership when there is a minimum degree of preference alignment, 
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for example as a result of the application of entry conditions. In practice, entry conditions 
have not been very strict and donors use GBS to influence policies and governance in the 
recipient country. This paper has shown that the re-introduction of substantial 
conditionality may theoretically undermine several of the assumed advantages of GBS, 
including its final objective of more effective poverty reduction. In addition, there may be 
a trade-off between the poverty reduction and objective to improve governance. 
 The paper answers four questions for the case of Nicaragua. The first question was 
whether GBS was implemented in line with the principles ownership, harmonisation, and 
predictability. The paper concludes that not all conditions for setting up GBS were 
fulfilled at the start. The Bolaños government wanted to change government institutions 
in line with donor preferences, but lacked support from these institutions and from 
Parliament to do so. Furthermore, this government gave a very low priority to poverty 
reduction. As a result, donors practiced extensive ex ante conditionality, trying to push 
the Executive to care more about income distribution and social sectors, and trying to 
pressure unwilling other state institutions for modernizing governance. The preferences 
of the Ortega government allowed for a more harmonious policy dialogue on poverty 
reduction, but donors then began to only focus on governance issues - in which 
preferences of government and donors laid far apart. Although not all disbursement 
conditions were harmonised, donors by and large succeeded in coming to a joint 
assessment of government performance - at least during the first three years of the GBS 
agreement. This changed from 2008 onwards when donors had different responses to 
perceived breaches of the fundamental principles of the JFA. The predictability of GBS 
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resources was good in 2006 and in 2007, but lower in 2005 and 2008 when donors 
reduced disbursements for reasons that were not always clear in advance.  
 In both periods, donors put more efforts in influencing the government on 
governance issues than on poverty reduction policies. This is also revealed by the motives 
for (threats of) suspension of disbursements, which were always related to governance 
issues or. democratic principles. The attempts to influence had only limited results: 
sometimes there was formal compliance but very little substantial compliance, and the 
attempts to influence political issues during the Ortega government were not successful. 
  GBS clearly had some positive intermediate effects in Nicaragua. It had lower 
transaction costs and helped strengthening government systems. There were also some 
positive effects on domestic accountability during the Bolaños government. The most 
likely macroeconomic use of GBS has been the repayment of domestic debts; this means 
that GBS resources have contributed to macroeconomic stability, so indirectly to 
economic growth.  
 The final question was whether government policies, supported by GBS resources 
and possibly changed under influence of the donors, have become more effective in 
reducing poverty. For the period of the Bolaños government, the answer must be no. The 
priorities of donors and government were elsewhere. During the Ortega government, the 
GBS resources can be expected to have contributed to poverty reduction, as this 
government carried out policies that were more effective for reducing poverty. Yet, 
bilateral donors and the EU began to suspend budget support from 2008 onwards, for 
governance reasons, so they only briefly helped financing these more effective policies. 
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 All in all, the paper shows that improving governance was a more important 
objective for most donors than poverty reduction, in both periods. The results on this 
objective were limited. The provision of GBS did have some positive intermediate effects 
such as improved macroeconomic stability, improved government systems, reduced 
transaction costs and improved domestic accountability - the latter during the period of 
President Bolaños only. These intermediate effects may indirectly have contributed to 
economic growth and poverty reduction. But the paper also shows that the donor priority 
for governance rather than poverty reduction has reduced the effects of GBS on poverty 
reduction. GBS did not help changing the policy priorities of the Bolaños government 
and actual poverty increased during his presidency. Under President Ortega poverty 
began to decline but the donors stopped supporting these policies with GBS resources. 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 The approval meant that abortion would be punished even if the life of the mother was 
in danger or if the pregnancy was the result of rape. 
2
 The first implies handing over a cow, a pig and a hen to a poor household, the second is 
a transfer of credit to female micro and small enterprises at an annual interest rate of 4 per 
cent.  
3
 According to the NGO Etica y Transparencia, as published in Revista Envío No 332, 
March 2009. http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/3952. 
4
 Norway was willing to continue but did not want to be the sole remaining bilateral 
donor. Because this donor did not agree with the political use of the GBS instrument, it 
decided to leave the JFA early 2009. 
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5
 Venezuelan aid was dependent on the oil price, which decreased at the end of 2008. 
6
 In 2005, 41 per cent of all actions and indicators was complied with, in 2006 only 33 
per cent. This figure increased to 83 per cent  in 2007. In 2008, 37 per cent of actions and 
indicators was complied with fully, while all others were achieved to a 50 per cent 
degree. Source: interview with government GBS coordinator. 
7
 Representatives of the Dutch Embassy in Nicaragua argued that this was partly due to 
the fact that headquarters hesitated too long in making this decision. 
8
 This conclusion is based on estimates of transaction costs involved in all three types of 
transaction costs for GBS and for projects, for donors and for government, and comparing 
this with the relation between the average annual amount of GBS disbursements (US$ 75 
million) with the size of the average bilateral or multilateral project (US$ 5 million) The 
estimated transaction costs for GBS do not exceed  15 times the average project 
transaction costs. 
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Figure 1. Poverty indicators Nicaragua 2001-2010 
 
 
 
Sources: World Bank (2008) and FIDEG (2010, 2011). 
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Table 1. Evaluation framework for general budget support 
Inputs Donor priorities for entry 
conditions and for the policy 
dialogue 
Money 
Necessary 
features 
Harmonisation Extent of 
alignment of 
preferences   
Harmonisation Predictability 
Output Changes in policies and 
governance 
 
Domestic systems strengthened by using 
them 
Lower transaction costs 
Domestic accountability improved 
Lower deficit or additional (poverty 
reduction) expenditure 
Outcome Improved policies and governance 
Improved government effectiveness: higher quantity and quality and better 
targeting of services 
Impact Improved governance 
More effective poverty reduction 
 
 
Appendix Table 1. Budget support, programme aid, and total aid in millions of US$, and in per cent if so indicated 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Average 
2001-04 
Average 
2005-08 
Total budget support 0 31.2 25.2 109.3 40.2 131.9 98.5 30.0 41.4 75.2 
   Loans 0 14.9 0 50.9 5.2 62.6 45.7 0.0 16.5 28.4 
   Grants 0 16.3 25.2 58.4 35 69.3 52.8 30.0 25.0 46.8 
Total Programme aid 3.7 33.9 27.5 110.4 51.3 132.7 109.1 30.7 43.9 81.0 
Budget support as % of total aid 0.0 5.9 4.3 16.8 7.1 20.6 14.3 7.3 6.7 12.3 
Programme aid as % of total aid 0.7 6.4 4.7 16.9 9.1 20.7 15.8 7.4 7.2 13.3 
Budget support as % of total expenditure 0.0 3.4 2.7 10.8 4.2 10.6 7.1 1.9 4.2 5.9 
Budget support as % of GDP 0.0 0.8 0.6 2.4 0.8 2.5 1.7 0.6 1.0 1.4 
Total aid as % of total expenditure 49.0 57.0 62.8 64.7 58.4 51.3 49.7 26.3 58.4 46.4 
Total aid as % of GDP 13.1 13.1 14.3 14.6 11.6 12.1 12.1 7.7 13.8 10.9 
Sources: Central Bank of Nicaragua (CBN) for aid figures and GDP in US$, Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (MHCP) for total 
budgets, CBN for exchange rates; and own calculations.
Appendix Table 2. Sources and uses of government resources, in  per cent of GDP 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Government revenues 14.8 16.4 17.2 18.0 18.8 19.6 19.0 
  Tax revenues 13.4 15.1 15.7 16.7 17.4 18.0 17.6 
  Other income 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.5 
Total expenditure 20.4 24.1 22.4 22.5 22.7 22.7 22.9 
Deficit -5.6 -7.8 -5.3 -4.5 -3.9 -3.1 -3.8 
Financing of deficit:        
  Grants 3.7 5.3 2.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.3 
  Net external financing 2.0 4.0 5.7 3.5 2.7 2.6 1.7 
  Net internal financing -0.1 -1.5 -3.2 -2.8 -2.6 -3.2 -1.2 
        
Total expenditure 20.4 24.1 22.4 22.5 22.7 22.7 22.9 
  Poverty expenditure 9.1 11.1 12.0 13.1 12.3 13.3 13.4 
  Social expenditure 8.5 10.2 10.3 11.2 11.1 11.7 12.3 
  Interest internal debt 1.6 2.5 1.6 0.6** 1.2 1.0 0.7 
  Interest external debt 1.1 1.9 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 
  Other expenditure* 9.2 9.6 10.2 10.3 9.9 9.5 9.5 
Memo items:        
Programme aid 0.8 0.7 2.5 1.1 2.5 1.9 0.5 
Amortisation external 
debt 
2.0 3.2 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.6 
New external loans 4.0 7.2 6.2 4.1 3.5 3.3 2.3 
Deficit after grants -1.8 -2.5 -2.5 -0.7 -0.1 0.6 -0.5 
*Total minus social minus debt payments. 
**The 2005 figure for interest on internal debt is much higher in Table VI-9 of Fiscal 
accounts from the Central Bank (1.4 per cent of GDP), but here the figures of the 
Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (MHCP) are used. 
Sources: Own calculations based on: MHCP (Liquidación presupuestaria) for budget 
data, Central Bank of Nicaragua for GDP data and exchange rates (year average) 
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Appendix Table 3. Some social indicators 1993-2008 
 1993 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Net primary enrolment 76  83 86 86 87 84 86 87 87 
Illiteracy 19  19    18  20 8 
Infant mortality 58 42 30     29   
Child mortality 72 51 37     35   
Chronic malnutrition 20  18    17 17   
Immunisation rate  80 72     85   
Institutional births 64 66     74   
Access to water* 68  70    72 85 65 70 
Access to sanitation* 45  52    56  36 42 
* Given the large fall in 2007 and 2008, the definition of this access has probably 
changed over time. 
Sources: 1993, 2001, 2005: World Bank (2008); child and infant mortality, immunisation 
rate and institutional births 1998, 2001, and 2006: Nicaragua Demographic and Health 
Survey 2008; For 2002, 2003, and 2004: Data from Nicaraguan ministries of Education 
and Health as published in Guimarães J. and Avendaño, N. (2008) Por fin, la pobreza? 
Country report Nicaragua 2007. Evaluation of Poverty Reduction Strategies in Latin 
America. Stockholm: Sida.; for 2006: Government of Nicaragua (2007), Nicaragua: 
Progress report national development plan 2006. Managua: Secretaría Técnica del Poder 
Ciudadano SETEC; for 2007 and 2008: Government of Nicaragua (2008), 'Programa 
Económico-Financiero 2007-2010, Evaluación de Indicadores Sociales 2008' (from 
www.bcn.gob.ni, accessed 10 November 2009).   
  
 
